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Abstract
This paper analyzes the e¤ects of bubbles in an innitely-lived
agent model of endogenous growth with nancial frictions and het-
erogeneous agents. We provide a complete characterization on the
relationship between nancial frictions and the existence of bubbles.
Our model predicts that if the degree of pledgeability is su¢ ciently
high or su¢ ciently low, bubbles can not exist. They can only arise
at an intermediate degree. This suggests that improving the nancial
market condition might enhance the possibility of bubbles. We also
examine whether bubbles are growth-enhancing or growth-impairing
in the long run. We show that when the degree of pledgeability is
relatively low, bubbles boost long-run growth. On the other hand,
when it is relatively high, bubbles lower long-run growth. Moreover,
we examine the e¤ects of the burst of bubbles, and show that the ef-
fects much depend on the degree of the pldgeability, i.e., the quality
of nancial system.
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1 Introduction
Many countries have experienced large movements in asset prices called asset
bubbles. The boom and bust of asset bubbles is associated with signicant
uctuations in real economic activity. A notable example is the recent global
economic up and down before and after the nancial crisis. For this reason,
it has been of great concern for many economists or policy makers to under-
stand why bubbles emerge and how they a¤ect economies. For example, it
is recognized that emerging market economy often experienced bubble-like
dynamics. As explored by Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2006), the nan-
cial imperfection or less developed nancial market is a key element of the
existence of bubbles in emerging market economy. However, if the nancial
imperfection is the reason of bubbles, why do less developed countries such
as African countries not experience the bubbly economy? In order to ex-
amine this point, we address the following questions: How is the emergence
of bubbles related to nancial conditions? Are bubbles more likely to occur
in nancially developed economies or less-developed ones? How do bubbles
a¤ect investment and long run growth, in other words, do they crowd invest-
ment in and enhance growth or do they crowd it out and impair growth?
How does the e¤ects of burst of bubbles on the growth rate become di¤erent
according to nancial conditions?
To answer these questions, we develop an innitely lived agent model of
endogenous growth with two important characteristics. One is the presence
of heterogeneous investment opportunities. In our model, there are two types
of investments. Some of the entrepreneurs have high productive investment
(H-projects) and the others have low productive ones (L-projects). A key as-
sumption is that the productivity of each entrepreneurs investment changes
over time. That is, the entrepreneurs who have L-projects (H-projects) in
the current period may have H-projects (L-projects) in the future with some
probabilities. This assumption allows for a situation that the entrepreneurs
purchase bubbles when they have L-projects, because the rate of return of
them is greater than that of L-projects, and use them for H-projects when
they meet the projects.
The other characteristics is the presence of nancial frictions. We assume
that the entrepreneurs can pledge only a fraction of the return from the
investment to creditors. This fraction reects the degree of nancial market
imperfections. Higher (lower) fraction implies that the degree of nancial
imperfection is low (high). Recently, this nancial imperfection has been
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focused in many theoretical and empirical papers. Because of this limited
pledgeability, the entrepreneurs are credit constrained when they have H-
projects, and their investment depends on the amount of their net worth.
Moreover, bubbles a¤ect the net worth level crucially.
Under these two key frameworks, the theoretical challenges of this paper
are twofold. First, we identify the relation between the existence of bubbles
and the degree of nancial imperfection. Second, we characterize the macro-
economic consequences of bubbles according to the degree of imperfection.
Concerning the existence of bubbles in innite horizon economies, it is
commonly thought that bubbles can not arise in deterministic sequential mar-
ket economies with a nite number of innitely lived agents (Tirole, 1982). In
Tirole model, the nancial market is assumed to be perfect, that is, agents are
allowed to borrow and lend freely. Tirole has shown that in such an environ-
ment, no equilibrium with bubbles exists. This result holds true in our model
too. That is, when the pledgeability is equal to one, which means nancial
market is perfect, bubbles can not arise. However, if the pledgeability is less
than one and the nancial market is imperfect, our model shows that even in
innite horizon economies, bubbles can occur. A complete characterization
of the steady state with bubbles is provided. Our model shows that bub-
bles can not exist if the pledgeability is su¢ ciently low or su¢ ciently high.
This suggests that bubbles can not occur in nancially underdeveloped or
well-developed economies. They can only occur in nancially intermediate-
developed ones (intermediate pledgeability level). This result suggests that
improving the nancial market condition might enhance the emergence of
bubbles if the initial condition of the nancial market is underdeveloped.1
Of course, the possibility of bubbles in innite horizon economies with bor-
rowing constraint has been recognized even in the previous papers, such as
Scheinkman and Weiss (1986), Kocherlakota (1992), Santos and Woodford
(1997), and Hellwig and Lorenzoni (2009). All of these studies are based
on an endowment economy, however. Our papers contribution is that we
consider a heterogenous investments model and give a full characterization
on the relation between the existence of bubbles and nancial frictions in the
production economy.
Our model also has macroeconomic implications of bubbles. The conven-
1In this sense, ours is related to Matsuyama (2007, 2008), in which Matsuyama shows
that a better credit market might be more prone to nancing what he calls bad investments,
which do not have positive spillover e¤ects on future generations.
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tional wisdom (Samuelson, 1958; Tirole, 1985) suggests that bubbles crowd
investment out and lower output. In the traditional view, the nancial mar-
ket is perfect, and all the saving in the economy ow to investment. In
such a situation, once bubbles appear in the economy, they crowd savings
away from investment. Saint-Paul (1992), Grossman and Yanagawa (1993),
and King and Ferguson (1993) extend Samuelson-Tirole model to economies
with endogenous growth, and have shown that bubbles reduce investment
and retard long run economic growth.23
More recently, however, some researchers such as Woodford (1990), Ca-
ballero and Krishnamurthy (2006), Kiyotaki and Moore (2008), Kocherlakota
(2009), and Martin and Ventura (2010) develop a model with nancial fric-
tions, and show that bubbles crowd investment in and increase output. In
these studies, because of the presence of nancial market imperfections,
enough resources can not be transfered to those who have investment from
those who do not. As a result, underinvestment occurs. Bubbles help to
transfer resources between them.
A natural question is why do we observe such contradicting views? Where
does such a discrepancy in opinion come from? The second contribution of
our paper is to unify these two conicting views within one theoretical frame-
work. The key point is the limited pledgeability. In our model, when bubbles
emerge, the interest rate rises. This produces two competing e¤ects. One is a
crowd-out e¤ect. That is, the entrepreneurs who have H-projects are forced
to cut back on their investment because the borrowing constraint becomes
tight. This reduces their net worth and crowd investment out. On the other
hand, the rise in the interest rate produces a crowd-in e¤ect too. That is,
in our model, the entrepreneurs who have L-projects purchase bubbles, and
when they meet an opportunity to invest in H-projects in the future, they
sell bubbles. Since the rate of return of bubbles is high together with the
rise in the interest rate, by selling bubbles, their net worth increases, which
crowds investment in. If the latter dominates the former, bubbles enhance
growth. Otherwise, they lower it. We show that the balance between these
2This crowd-out e¤ect of bubbles has been criticized, because it seems inconsistent with
historical evidence that investment and economic growth rate tend to surge when bubbles
pop up, and then stagnate when they burst.
3Olivier (2000) shows that the conclusions in Saint-Paul (1992), Grossman and Yana-
gawa (1993), and King and Ferguson (1993) crucially depend on the type of asset that is
being speculated on. Bubbles on equity markets can be growth-enhancing while bubbles
on unproductive assets are growth-impairing.
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two conicting forces changes according to the degree of nancial imperfec-
tion. In other words, there is a threshold value of the degree of pledgeability
below which bubbles are growth-enhancing and above which they are growth-
impairing.
The crowd-in e¤ect caused by the rise in the interest rate in our model is
in sharp contrast with a standard investment theory. In the standard view,
when the interest rate goes up, rms always want to invest less. However,
in our model with imperfect nancial markets, the rise in the interest rate
generates not only the crowd-out e¤ect as in the traditional view, but also
the crowd-in e¤ect by increasing net worth. In this respect, our paper shares
with Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) the idea
that an improvement in borrower net worth, which is caused by positive
productivity shocks in their paper, produces positive balance sheet e¤ects,
thereby increasing investment. In our paper, the rise in the interest rate
caused by bubbles generates positive balance sheet e¤ects.
Moreover, in our model, bubbles may improve the e¢ ciency in production.
Without bubbles and when the pledgeability is relatively low, the nancial
markets can not transfer all the saving of the entrepreneurs who have L-
projects to the ones who have H-projects. As a result, the entrepreneurs
with L-projects cannot use their savings e¢ ciently and end up with investing
in their own projects with low returns. However, the emergence of bubbles
eliminates the production of those L-projects, transferring more resources
to the entrepreneurs with productive investment. This also implies that,
when the pledgeability is relatively low, bubbles burst produces productive
ine¢ ciency.
Our paper is related to a number of research on bubbles. In the tra-
ditional literature (Samuelson; 1958, Tirole; 1985), bubbles can only occur
in an equilibria where overinvestment occurs. In our study, however, over-
investment does not occur, but underinvestment occurs because of limited
pledgeability, which implies that some of the saving in the economy ow to
L-projects. Bubbles can arise in such equilibria as well as in equilibria where
all the savings are allocated to H-projects.
The role of bubbles in supporting investment when there is limited pledge-
ability has been addressed for example in Woodford (1990), Kocherlakota
(2009), and Martin and Ventura (2010). In their study, none of the returns
from investment can be pledgeable, and thus nobody can borrow and lend.4
4In Kocherlakota (2009), agents can borrow against bubbles in land prices. However,
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In our study, however, the entrepreneurs are allowed to borrow as long as
debts are secured by collateral. In this sense, our study examines a general
case of their arguments.
Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2006) develop a theory of stochastic bub-
bles in emerging markets using an overlapping generations model. In their
model, even if bubbles emerge, the loan rate does not rise, and thus the
crowd-out e¤ect does not operate. However, in our model, the loan rate
increases, which produces the crowd-out e¤ect.
Farhi and Tirole (2010) are closely related to ours in the point that bub-
bles a¤ect investment through a rise in the interest rate. In their model,
the e¤ects of the rise in the interest rate on investment crucially depends on
what they call outside liquidity. Positive outside liquidity means that the
entrepreneurs are net receivers of interest, in which case bubbles increase the
interest income and their net worth, thereby crowding investment in, while
negative means that they need to repay interest on net, in which case the
opposite happens. In our model, however, the e¤ects of the rise in the inter-
est rate on investment depends on the pledgeability, and we can characterize
the e¤ects of bubbles by the degree of the pledgeability.
Kiyotaki and Moore (2008) are also related to ours. In their theory, since
at money (bubbles) has more advantage in lubricating exchange, people
hold money, even though the rate of return of it is low. They emphasize the
role of money (bubbles) as a medium of exchange. In our model, however,
we focus on the role of bubbles as a store of value. The entrepreneurs buy
bubbles, because the rate of return of them is high.
without such bubbles, nobody can borrow and lend.
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2 The Model
Consider a discrete-time economy with one homogenous good and a contin-
uum of entrepreneurs. A typical entrepreneur has the following expected
utility,
E0
" 1X
t=0
t log cit
#
; (1)
where i is the index for each entrepreneur, and cit is the consumption of him at
date t.  2 (0; 1) is the subjective discount factor, and E0 [x] is the expected
value of x conditional on information at date 0.
At each date, each entrepreneur meets high productive investment projects
(thereafter H-projects) with probability p, and low productive investments
(L-projects) with probability 1   p.5 The investment technologies are as
follows,
yit+1 = 
i
tz
i
t; (2)
where zit( 0) is the investment level at date t and yit+1 is the output at
date t + 1. it is the marginal productivity of investment at date t. 
i
t =
H if the entrepreneur has H-projects, and it = 
L if he has L-projects.
We assume H > L. 6 The probability p is exogenous, and independent
across entrepreneurs and over time. At the beginning of each date t, the
entrepreneur knows his own type at date t, whether he has H-projects or
L-projects. Assuming that the initial population measure of each type of the
entrepreneur is one at date 0, the population measure of each type after date
1 is 2p and 2   2p, respectively. We call the entrepreneurs with H-projects
(L-projects) "H-entrepreneurs" ("L-entrepreneurs").
In this economy, we assume that because of frictions in a nancial market,
5A similar setting is used in in Kaas (2009), Kiyotaki and Moore (2008), and Kocher-
lakota (2009). In Woodford (1990), the entrepreneurs have investment opportunities in
alternating periods.
6We can also consider the model where capital goods is produced by the investment
technology. For example, let kit+1 = 
i
tz
i
t be the investment technology, where k is capital
goods. Capital fully depreciates in one period. Consumption goods is produced by the
following aggregate production function: Yt = Kt N
1 
t
k1 t , where K and N are the
aggregate capital and labor input, and k is per-labor capital of the economy, capturing
the externality in order to generate endogenous growth. In this type of the model, we can
obtain the same results as this paper.
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the entrepreneur can pledge at most a fraction  of the future return from
his investment to creditors.7 In such a situation, in order for debt contracts
to be credible, debts repayment cannot exceed the pledgeable value. That
is, the borrowing constraint becomes
rtb
i
t  itzit; (3)
where rt and bit are the gross interest rate, and the amount of borrowing
at date t, respectively. The parameter  2 [0; 1], which is assumed to be
exogenous, can be naturally taken to be the degree of imperfection of the
nancial market.
The entrepreneurs ow of funds constraint is given by
cit + z
i
t = y
i
t   rt 1bit 1 + bit: (4)
The left hand side of (4) is expenditure on consumption and investment.
The right hand side is nancing which comes from the return from investment
in the previous period minus debts repayment, and borrowing. We dene the
net worth of the entrepreneur as eit  yit   rt 1bit 1.
2.1 Equilibrium
Let us denote the aggregate consumption of H-and L-entrepreneurs at date t
as
P
i2Ht c
i
t  CHt and
P
i2Lt c
i
t  CLt , where Ht and Lt mean a family of H-
and L-entrepreneurs at date t. Similarly, let
P
i2Ht z
i
t  ZHt ;
P
i2Lt z
i
t  ZLt ;P
i2Ht b
i
t  BHt ; and
P
i2Lt b
i
t  BLt be aggregate investment, and borrowing
of each type. Then, the market clearing condition for goods, and the market
clearing condition for credit are
CHt + C
L
t + Z
H
t + Z
L
t = Yt; (5)
BHt +B
L
t = 0; (6)
where
P
i2(Ht[Lt) y
i
t  Yt is the aggregate output at date t.
The competitive equilibrium is dened as a set of prices frtg1t=0 and quan-
tities

cit; b
i
t; z
i
t; y
i
t+1; C
H
t ; C
L
t ; B
H
t ; B
L
t ; Z
H
t ; Z
L
t ; Yt
	1
t=0
, such that (i) the mar-
ket clearing conditions, (5) and (6), are satised, and (ii) each entrepreneur
7See Hart and Moore (1994) and Tirole (2006) for the foundations of this setting.
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chooses consumption, borrowing, investment, and output to maximize his
expected utility (1) under the constraints (2), (3), (4), and the following
transversality condition.
lim
t!1
t
1
cit
(zit   bit) = 0 (7)
Since the utility function is log-linear, each entrepreneur consumes a frac-
tion 1   of the net worth every period, that is, cit = (1  )(yit  rt 1bit 1).8
Thus, the entrepreneurs maximization problem is replaced with the following
one,
Max
zit;b
i
t
itz
i
t   rtbit; subject to zit = eit + bit; and rtbit  itzit:
Given eit; and rt; the entrepreneur chooses z
i
t and b
i
t to maximize the net
worth of the next period itz
i
t   rtbit subject to the ow of funds, and the
borrowing constraints. If and only if it > rt; the borrowing constraint, (3),
becomes binding because the rate of return on investment is strictly greater
than the interest rate.
2.2 The Case with  = 1 : Perfect Financial Market
First, let us consider the case with a perfect nancial market, that is  = 1. In
this case, if H > rt; H-entrepreneur must be willing to borrow an unlimited
amount. On the other hand, if L < H < rt; nobody would borrow. Thus,
the equilibrium interest rate must be
rt = 
H :
Since each entrepreneur saves a fraction  of the net worth every period,
the aggregate saving in the economy is Yt; which ows to nance H-projects.
Thus, the law of motion of the aggregate output becomes
Yt+1 = 
HYt; (8)
and we get the growth rate of the aggregate output as follows,
8See, for example, chapter 1.7 of Sargent (1988).
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gt  Yt+1
Yt
= H: (9)
We observe that the growth rate is independent of wealth distribution.
Since we have assumed simple linear production functions, the interest rate is
equal to the marginal productivity of H-projects and the steady state growth
rate is positive. Moreover, the interest rate is strictly greater than the growth
rate of the economy and the trasversarity condition is satised, as explored
in the traditional literature.
2.3 The Case with  < 1 : Imperfect Financial Market
Next, we examine the case with an imperfect nancial market, that is  < 1.
Even if  < 1, all of the total saving is used for H-projects and rt = H
as long as  is su¢ ciently high. Hence, in this section, we focus on the case
where the interest rate is strictly lower than H and the borrowing constraint
is binding for H-enterpreneurs,
L  rt < H :
In equilibrium, the interest rate must be at least as high as L, since nobody
lends to the projects if rt < L. We will explore later that which range of 
satises the above condition about rt.
Since each entrepreneur consumes a fraction 1    of the net worth, we
get the following relation from (4),
zit   bit = (yit   rt 1bit 1):
On the other hand, as long as rt < H , the borrowing constraint, (3), is
binding and bit satises the following relation,
bit =
H
rt
zit:
From those two relations, we can derive the following investment function
for the H-entrepreneurs at date t,
10
zit =
(yit   rt 1bit 1)
1  
H
rt
: (10)
This is a popular investment function under nancial constraint problems.9
We see that the investment equals the leverage, 1=

1  (H=rt)

, times
savings, (yit   rt 1bit 1). The leverage increases with  and is greater than
one in equilibrium. This implies that when  is larger, H-entrepreneurs can
nance more investment, zit.
By aggregating (10), we get
ZHt =
EHt
1  
H
rt
; (11)
where
P
i2Ht e
i
t  EHt is the aggregate net worth of H-entrepreneurs at date
t. The movement of the aggregate net worth of H-entrepreneurs evolves
according to the following equation.
EHt = p(
HZHt 1   rt 1BHt 1) + p(LZLt 1   rt 1BLt 1) = pYt: (12)
The rst term of (12) represents the aggregate net worth of the entrepreneurs
who continue to have H-projects from the previous period (we call H-H en-
trepreneurs). The second term represents the aggregate net worth of the
entrepreneurs who switch from the state with L-projects to the state with
H-projects (we call L-H entrepreneurs). Since every entrepreneur has the
same chance to meet H-projects at each period, the aggregate net worth of
H-entrepreneurs at date t is a fraction p of the aggregate output at date t.
Hence, (11 ) can be rewritten as
ZHt =
pYt
1  
H
rt
: (13)
For L-entrepreneurs, if rt = L, lending and borrowing to invest are indif-
ferent. Thus, how much they invest in their own projects is indeterminate at
9See, for example, Bernanke et al. (1999), Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), and Kiyotaki
and Moore (1997).
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an individual level. However, their aggregate investments level is determined
by the goods market clearing condition,
ZHt + Z
L
t = Yt: (14)
This implies that the aggregate investment of L-entrepreneurs equals the
aggregate saving minus the aggregate investment of H-entrepreneurs. On
the other hand, if rt > L, ZLt must be zero. Thus, the following conditions
must be satised.
ZLt (rt   L) = 0; ZLt  0; rt   L  0: (15)
The aggregate output is
Yt+1 = 
HZHt + 
LZLt ;
and can be rewritten as
Yt+1 = 
HYt   (H   L)ZLt :
Hence, the growth rate of Yt becomes as follows,
gt  Yt+1
Yt
= H   (H   L)lt; (16)
where lt  ZLt =Yt, the ratio of the low productive investment to the total in-
vestment. The interpretation of this relation is simple. As long as the amount
of L-projects, lt, is zero, the total saving is allocated to the H-projects, and
the growth rate of this economy becomes H , which is just same as that
under the perfect nancial market. If lt > 0, however, the di¤erence of pro-
ductivity between H-projects and L-projects, H  L, decreases the growth
rate and gt becomes H   (H   L)lt.
Next, we examine the equilibrium level of lt and how the equilibrium lt
is a¤ected by the degree of nancial imperfection, . Since lt  ZLt =Yt =
(Yt   ZHt )= Yt, we can rewrite lt and gt as follows,
lt = 1  p
1  
H
rt
=
rt(1  p)  H
rt   H = l(rt; ); (17)
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gt  Yt+1
Yt
= H   (H   rt)l(rt; ): (18)
From (15), the following relations must be satised,
(rt   L)rt(1  p)  
H
rt   H = 0; lt  0; rt   
L  0: (19)
Those imply that rt must be L or H=(1 p). If H=(1 p)  L, rt = L
since rt cannot be lower than L. On the other hand, if H=(1  p) > L,
rt = 
H=(1   p) since lt cannot be negative. Hence, we get the following
relation.
rt = r() =
8>>><>>>:
L; if 0   < (1  p)
L
H
;
H
1  p; if (1  p)
L
H
  < 1  p;
and
lt = l(r(); ) =
8>>><>>>:
L(1  p)  H
L   H ; if 0   < (1  p)
L
H
;
0 if (1  p)
L
H
  < 1  p:
From those results, we get the following equilibrium growth rate.
gt = g() =
8>>><>>>:
H   (H   L)
L(1  p)  H
L   H ; if 0   < (1  p)
L
H
;
H ; if (1  p)
L
H
  < 1  p;
(20)
(20) implies that the growth rate of the economy, gt; is an increasing func-
tion of , because more savings ow to H-projects from L-projects through
the relaxation of the borrowing constraint, which improves the aggregate
total factor productivity and enhance growth.10Moreover, from the above
10The recent macroeconomic literature emphasizes the role of TFP in accounting for
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relation, we can nd that if   1  p, rt = H and gt = H .
In summary, we get the following proposition.
Proposition 1 When  < 1 and bubbles do not exist, the equilibrium interest
rate, rt, and the equilibrium growth rate, gt, are the following increasing
functions of ; respectively.
rt = r() =
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
L; if 0   < (1  p)
L
H
;
H
1  p; if (1  p)
L
H
  < 1  p;
H ; if 1  p  :
gt = g() =
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
H   (H   L)
L(1  p)  H
L   H ; if 0   < (1  p)
L
H
;
H ; if (1  p)
L
H
  < 1  p;
H ; if 1  p  :
If 0   < (1   p)L=H , the degree of pledgeability is so small, i.e.,
nancial frictions are so severe. Then, it is di¢ cult for the nancial system
to transfer all the savings of L-entrepreneurs to H-projects. As a result, L-
entrepreneurs hold idle savings and end up with investing such idle savings
in their own investment with low returns. The severer nancial frictions
are, the more L-projects are nanced in the economy. However, as nancial
frictions improve, more savings ow to H-projects. This improvement in
saving allocations increases the aggregate total factor productivity, which
leads to higher growth. On the other hand, the interest rate is suppressed at
a low level of L because of the severity of nancial frictions.
If (1 p)L=H   < 1 p, L-entrepreneurs can lend all of their savings
to H-entrepreneurs, even though the nancial market is still imperfect. As
a result, only H-entrepreneurs invest. Hence, the economys growth rate is
business cycles or growth. In our model, the aggregate TFP is endogenously determined
depending on saving allocations between H-projects and L-projects, which in turn depends
on  in the steady state.
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H . In this region, together with an improvement in nancial frictions, the
interest rate rises due to the tightness in the nancial market. Note that
the borrowing constraint is still binding for H-entrepreneurs in this region,
because the interest rate is strictly lower than the rate of return on H-projects.
If 1  p  , and the degree of pledgeability is large enough, the interest
rate is equal to the rate of return on H-projects. The interest rate becomes
equal to the rate of return on H-projects, and the borrowing constraint no
longer binds for H-entrepreneurs. The nancial system can allocate all the
saving in the economy to H-projects, and resource allocation is e¢ cient, even
though  is strictly less than one.11 In this region, the characteristics of the
economy is the same as the one with the perfect nancial market.
Figure 1 depicts this situation. In horizontal axis, we take , and in
vertical axis, we take g and r: It is shown that the relation between g and 
is nonlinear. As we will show below, this nonlinearity plays a crucial role in
creating regions where bubbles can arise (bubble regions), or regions where
they can not arise (non-bubble regions).
3 Existence of Asset Bubbles
Now we describe the economy with asset bubbles (we call "bubble economy").
Let xit be the level of bubble assets purchased by type i entrepreneur at date
t, and let Pt be the per unit price of them at date t in terms of consumption
goods. In the bubble economy, each entrepreneur faces the following three
constraints; ow of funds condition, the borrowing constraint, and the short
sale constraint:
cit + z
i
t + Ptx
i
t = y
i
t   rt 1bit 1 + bit + Ptxit 1; (21)
rt b
i
t  itzit + Pt+1xit; (22)
xit  0; (23)
where  represents the case of bubble economy. Both sides of (21) include
bubbles. Ptxit 1 in the right hand side is the sales of the bubble assets, and
11In  2 (0; 1  p), H-entrepreneurs earn H(1   )=  1  H=rt ; which is strictly
greater than rt that L-entrepreneurs earn. Thus, income distribution is di¤erent between
the entrepreneurs. However, in  2 [1  p; 1], both entrepreneurs earn the same rate of
return, which is H : Hence, there is no di¤erence in income distribution.
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Ptx
i
t in the left hand side is the new purchase of them. We dene the net worth
of the entrepreneur in the bubble economy as eit  yit   rt 1bit 1 + Ptxit 1:
(22) is the borrowing constraint under the bubble economy. For simplicity,
we assume here that the degree of pledgeability of the return from the bubbles
is equal to that of the return from H or L investments, . Even if we assume
that the pledgeable fraction of bubblesreturn, x < 1, is di¤erent from that
of the investments return, , our results which will be explained below are
not a¤ected.12
We should add a few remarks about the short sale constraint (23). As
Kocherlakota (1992) has shown, the short sale constraint plays an important
role for the existence of bubbles in deterministic economies with a nite
number of innitely lived agents. Without the constraint, bubbles always
represent an arbitrage opportunity for an innitely-lived agent; he can gain
by permanently reducing his holdings of the asset. However, it is well-known
that in such economies, equilibria can only exist if agents are constrained not
to engage in Ponzi schemes. Kocherlakota (1992) has demonstrated that the
short sale constraint is one of no-Ponzi-game conditions and hence, it can
support bubbles by eliminating the agents ability to permanently reduce his
holdings of the asset.13
In order that bubble assets are held in equilibrium, the rate of return of
bubbles has to be equal to the interest rate:
rt =
Pt+1
Pt
: (24)
Each entrepreneur chooses the levels of consumption, investment, output,
borrowing, and bubble assets

cit ; z
i
t ; y
i
t+1; b
i
t ; x
i
t
	
; to maximize the expected
utility (1) subject to (21), (22), and (23), given the interest rate and the cur-
rent and future price of bubbles, rt ; Pt; and Pt+1. Moreover, on the optimal
feasible plan, the following transversality condition must be satised.14
lim inf
t!1
t
1
cit
Ptx
i
t = 0 (25)
12As will be explained below, the crucial point for our results is that the previous return
from bubbles increases the net worth for a borrower.
13See Kocherlakota (1992) for details.
14See Kocherlakota (1992) for the transversality condition in economies with the short
sale constraint.
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As in the previous case, since the entrepreneur consumes a fraction 1 
of the net worth, the maximization problem for the entrepreneur can be
replaced with the following one:
Max
zit;b
i
t;x
i
t
itz
i
t   rt bit + Pt+1xit
subject to zit + Ptx
i
t = e
i
t + b
i
t ; (22); (23); (25):
As in the previous section, we focus on the case where the equilibrium
interest rate is strictly lower than the productivity of H-projects, that is, L-
entrepreneurs purchase bubbles and the borrowing constraint of H-entrepreneurs
is binding. The investment function of the entrepreneurs who have H-projects
at date t is
zt =
eit
1  
H
rt
:
where eit =  rt 1bit 1+Ptxit 1 for L-H entrepreneurs, and eit = yit  rt 1bit 1
for H-H entrepreneurs. For L-H entrepreneurs, since they purchased bubbles
in the previous period, they are able to sell bubbles at the time they meet
H-projects. As a result, their net worth becomes higher (compared to the
bubbleless case) and boosts their investments, that is, the "balance seat
e¤ect" works.15 Moreover, the expansion level of the investment is more
than the direct increase of net worth because of the leverage e¤ect. For H-H
entrepreneurs, they are not able to take advantage of this merit, because they
didnt buy bubbles in the previous period.
Next, we describe the aggregate economy. Since both H-and L-entrepreneurs
consume a fraction 1   of their net worth, the goods market clearing con-
dition can be written as
ZHt + PtX = (Y

t + PtX); (26)
where Y t +PtX and (Y

t +PtX) are the aggregate wealth (total asset) and
the aggregate saving in the bubble economy. X is the aggregate quantity of
bubbles, which is exogenously xed. We see that some of the aggregate saving
ow to bubble assets as well as H-projects, which can be the source for raising
15In Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), the rise in the land price increases the entrepreneurs
net worth, which results in producing balance sheet e¤ects, thereby increasing investment.
In this paper, bubbles play a similar role as the land in Kiyotaki and Moores paper.
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the interest rate in the nancial market. The aggregate demand for bubbles,
PtX, is equal to the aggregate saving minus the aggregate investment of
H-entrepreneurs, (Y t + PtX)  ZHt .
The aggregate investment function becomes,
ZHt =
EHt
1  
H
rt
;
where EHt = p(Y

t   rt 1BHt 1) + p(PtX   rt 1BLt 1) = p (Y t + PtX). The
rst term is the aggregate net worth of H-H entrepreneurs at date t and the
second term represents the one of L-H entrepreneurs at date t. Hence, it can
be written as
ZHt =
p (Y t + PtX)
1  
H
rt
: (27)
The aggregate wealth under the bubble economy can be written as,
Y t+1 + Pt+1X = 
HZHt + r

tPtX: (28)
In order to characterize the economic growth rate, let us dene as follows,
kt =
PtX
(Y t + PtX)
;
gkt =
Y t+1 + Pt+1X
Y t + PtX
;
where kt is the relative size of bubbles and gkt is the growth rate of the
aggregate wealth, Y t + PtX. From (27) and these denitions, (28) can be
written as
gkt = 
H p
1  
H
rt
+ rt kt: (29)
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Moreover, from (26), we get
p
1  
H
rt
+ kt = : (30)
From (29) (30), the growth rate of the aggregate wealth, gkt , becomes
gkt = 
H(1  kt) + rt kt = H   (H   rt )kt:
Furthermore,
kt = 1  p
1  
H
rt
=
rt (1  p)  H
rt   H
= l(rt ; ): (31)
This means that given rt and , the relative size of bubbles, kt, is just equal
to the relative size of L-projects, lt = l(rt; ) under the bubbleless economy.
Hence, we can derive the following growth rate function,
gkt (r

t ; ) = 
H   (H   rt )l(rt ; ):
This means the growth rate function in the bubble economy is just same as
the bubbleless economy. However, the growth rate becomes di¤erent since
the equilibrium interest rate is di¤erent.
Next we examine the determination process of rt . From the denition of
kt
kt+1
kt
=
rt
gkt
=
rt
H   (H   rt)kt : (32)
In order to satisfy the transversality condition (25),
kt+1
kt
=
rt
gkt
 1 (33)
should be satised. Moreover, if kt+1=kt < 1, the economy converges to the
asymptotically bubbleless economy. Hence, in this paper, we focus on the
case where kt+1=kt = 1, that is, the share of the bubble assets is constant
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under the steady state.16 Hence, at each period, the following condition must
be satised,
r() = H   (H   r())l(r(); ): (34)
From (31) and kt+1=kt = 1, we get the equilibrium interest rate and the
relative size of bubbles as follows,
rt = r
() = H
(1  ) + p
1   + p ;
kt = l(r
(); ) =
(1  p)  
(1  ) :
Furthermore, since the growth rate of the total output, gt  Y t+1=Y t is just
equal to gkt from kt+1=kt = 1, we get
gt = g
k
t = r
() = H  (H  r())l(r(); ) = H (1  ) + p
1   + p : (35)
Obviously, the equilibrium growth rate is an increasing function of . An
increase of  decreases the relative size of bubbles, kt, and raises the growth
rate.
3.1 Existence condition of bubbles
In this subsection, we examine the existence condition of bubbles. For the
existence of bubbles, the following two conditions must be satised. First, the
equilibrium interest rate must not be lower than L at each period. Second,
kt must be non-negative. In other words. the following two conditions must
be satised.
L  r() = H (1  ) + p
1   + p  
H ;
kt = l(r
(); ) =
(1  p)  
(1  ) > 0:
From these conditions, we get the following proposition.
16In our model, the steady state equilibrium with bubbles is unstable, while the one
without bubbles is stable. Thus, the bubble economy is vulnerable to shocks.
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Proposition 2 Bubbles can exist as long as  salsies the following condi-
tion,
 Max

L   fL + (H   L)pg
H(1  ) ; 0

  <   (1  p):
Proof. If H< L, the growth rate of this economy cannot be equal to
the interest rate and bubbles cannot exist. This situation is the case where
L   fL + (H   L)pg
H(1  ) > (1   p) and  which satises the above con-
dition does not exist. Thus, we focus on the cases where H  L. When
L   fL + (H   L)pg
H(1  ) > 0, r
() = L and l(r(); ) > 0. Since r()
is a strictly increasing function of , r() < L and bubbles cannot exist
if  <  =
L   fL + (H   L)pg
H(1  ) . On the other hand, r
()  L if
   = 
L   fL + (H   L)pg
H(1  ) . When
L   fL + (H   L)pg
H(1  )  0,
 = 0 and r(0)  L. But  cannot be negative. Hence, we do not have to
consider the case of  <  and r(0)  L as long as    = 0. However,
l(r(); ) is a decreasing function of  and l(r(); ) becomes zero when
 = (1  p) = . Therefore, bubbles can exist as long as    < .
From this proposition, we can understand that bubbles tend to exist
when the degree of nancial imperfection, , is in the middle range. In other
words, improving the nancial market condition might enhance the existence
of bubbles when the initial condition of  is low.17 This result is quite contrast
to the results in the previous literature such as Farhi and Tirole (2010), in
which bubbles are more likely to emerge when the nacial market is more
imperfect (when the pledgeability is more limited).
17The papers such as Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) and Allen and Gale (1999)) point
out that nancial liberalization causes bubbles. If we understand this from our model, one
interpretation goes as follows. For instance, before nancial liberalization, the economy is
in non-bubble regions. After the liberalization,  increases, and the borrowing constraint
is relaxed, so that the economy enters bubble regions. Like this, we might be able to think
of the increase in  as a measure of nancial liberalization.
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Figure 2 is a typical case representing the relation between  and bubble
regions.18 It is shown that if the degree of nancial frictions is su¢ ciently
large or small, bubbles can not exist. This suggests that in nancially under-
developed or well-developed economies, bubbles can not emerge. They can
only arise in nancially intermediate-developed ones.19 An intuitive reason
of this result is as follows. If  is low, H-entrepreneurs cannot borrow suf-
ciently and the growth rate must be low even with bubbles. On the other
hand, the interest rate cannot be lower than L since there is an opportu-
nity to invest in L-projects even if  is low. Hence, under very low  level,
the interest rate becomes higher than the growth rate and bubbles cannot
exist. Since we assume heterogenous investment opportunities, the interest
rate has the lowest bound and we can get the result which is di¤erent from
the previous literature20.
Moreover, we can characterize the existence condition by using the struc-
ture of the bubbleless economy. The existence condition of bubble is that
the growth rate is not lower than the interest rate under the bubbleless econ-
omy. This condition is consistent with the existence condition in the previous
literature such as Tirole(1985).
Proposition 3 The necessary condition for the existence of bubble is that
the equilibrium growth rate is not lower that the equilibrium interest rate
18Even though the growth rate is strictly greater than the interest rate, bubbles can not
arise in the economy unless people expect that they are able to pass bubbles on to other
people. This expectation is the su¢ cient condition for the existence of bubbles. Here, we
assume that the condition is satised when bubbles appear.
19Readers may wonder why the phenomenon which looks like bubbles occurs repeatedly
in the real world where the development of the nancial system keeps increasing over
time, even though our model suggests that bubbles do not appear in high  regions. We
propose one interpretation from our model. In the paper, we assume a common  on both
high and low investment. However, we can put di¤erent  on those projects. In such
a case, the important factor for the existence of bubbles is H ; which is placed on high
protable investment, not on low protable investment. Taking this into account, think
about the situation where the existing projects with L disappear, and new investment
opportunities with higher protability than the existing H appear into the economy. In
such a situation, the  which is placed on those new projects matters for the existence of
bubbles. If the  is low, the economy will get into bubble regions again even if it is in
non-bubble regions with high  before. In the real world, this process might repeat itself.
20Martin and Ventura (2010) assume two types of investment opportunities but bubbles
may be able to exist under the economy without credit market. The crucial di¤erence is
they allow bubble creations at each period.
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under the bubbleless economy.
Proof. If H < L, bubbles cannot exist as explained in the proposition 1,
and the growth rate under the bubbleless economy is lower than the interest
rate under the bubbleless economy for any :Next we check the case where
H  L. From the denition of , the following relation is satised.
H   (H   L)l(L; ) = L:
This relation means that at , the growth rate under the bubbleless economy
(the left hand side) is equal to the interest rate under the bubbleless economy
(the right hand side). When  is a little higher than  but smaller than
(1 p)L=H , the growth rate under the bubbleless economy becomes higher
than L but the interest rate is still L. Thus, the growth rate is higher than
the interest rate under the bubbleless economy. If  becomes higher than
(1  p)L=H , the interest rate becomes 
H
1  p which is higher than 
L and
the growth rate becomes H . Hence, the growth rate becomes lower than
the interest rate when  becomes higher than   (1  p). In summary, the
growth rate is higher than the interest rate under the bubbleless economy
when     , and      is exactly the necessary condition of existence
of bubbles.
4 Asset Bubbles and Economic Growth
In this section, we examine how bubbles a¤ect the economic growth rate. We
will show here that the e¤ect of bubbles on the growth rate is dependent upon
the nancial market condition, , even if the existence condition of bubbles is
satised. We can derive that there is a threshold level of ,  =
L
H
(1 p):
Proposition 4 Let us dene   
L
H
(1 p). If     , the growth rate
under the bubble economy is higher than that under the bubbleless economy
at each period. If  <  < , the growth rate under the bubble economy is
lower than that under the bubbleless economy at each period.
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Proof. From (18) and (35), gt = g() = H   (H  L) L(1 p) HL H , and
gt = r
() = H (1 )+p
1 +p . We derive  which satises gt = g

t , that is
H   (H   L)
L(1  p)  H
L   H = 
H (1  ) + p
1   + p :
This relation can be rewritten as
2    p
H + L(1  ) + L(1   + p)
H(1  ) 
+
 pL + L + (H   L)p  L
H
(1   + p)
H(1  ) = 0;
(36)
and we already know that  =  =
L(1   + p)  pH
H(1  ) satises this
(36). Thus,
(   )(   ) = 0
is equal to the above quadratic function (36). In other words,
 +  =
 pH + L(1  ) + L(1   + p)
H(1  )
 =
 pL + L + (H   L)p  L
H
(1   + p)
H(1  ) :
By solving these equations, we can derive that
 =
L
H
(1  p):
Furthermore, from the quadratic function (36), we can derive that gt < gt if
 < , and gt > gt if  > 
.
Proposition 5 implies that in the economies within the bubble regions and
with relatively low , bubbles enhance growth while in the economies with
relatively high , they impede it. Here we explain an intuitive reason of this
24
result. From (20) and (35), we get that
gt = 
H   (H   L)l(L; )
gt = 
H   (H   r())l(r(); )
The di¤erence between the two growth rates mainly comes from the di¤erence
in the interest rate. When bubbles appear in the economy, the interest rate
rises, which produces two competing e¤ects. One is a crowd-out e¤ect. That
is, H-entrepreneurs are forced to cut back on their investment because the
borrowing constraint becomes tight. This reduces the growth rate of the
aggregate net worth of H-entrepreneurs, which in turn crowds investment
out. The other is a crowd-in e¤ect. Due to the hike in the interest rate, the
interest income for L-entrepreneurs, which is the returns from purchasing
bubbles, rises. This increases the growth rate of the aggregate net worth of
H-entrepreneurs, which in turn crowds investment in. More precisely, the
di¤erence of the growth rates can be written as follows.
gt   gt = (r()  L)l(L; )  (H   r())(l(r(); )  l(L; )): (37)
In this formulation, the rst term of the right hand side represents the crowd-
in e¤ect and the second term of the right hand side represents the crowd-out
e¤ect. Since r()  L, the rst term is (weakly) positive. This term
captures the e¤ect that an increase of the interest rate raises the income of
the entrepreneurs who invested in the bubbles and enhances the economic
growth rate. More precisely, if there is no bubble, L-entrepreneurs have to
invest in L-projects, l(L; ), as long as the borrowing constraint of the H-
entrepreneurs is binding. If they have a chance to invest in bubble assets
instead of L-projects, they can earn r()l(L; ) instead of Ll(L; ). This
increased earning contributes to enhance the H-investment at the time they
become H-entrepreneurs in the future. Thus, this income e¤ect increases the
growth rate by the increase of H-investment.
The second term represents the crowd-out e¤ect. As you can see from
(17), l(r; ) is an increasing function of r. A rise of the interest rate tightens
the borrowing constraint of the H-entrepreneuers and increases the invest-
ments towards the L-projects or bubbles. Hence, l(r(); )   l(L; ) is
positive. Under the bubble economy, if  is low, l(L; ) is high and the
crowd-in e¤ect is high. On the other hand, if  is high, l(L; ) becomes
low and the crowd-in e¤ect is dominated by the crowd-out e¤ect. Thus, in
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the economies with relatively low , the crowd-in e¤ect dominates the crowd-
out e¤ect, but, in the economies with relatively high , the crowd-out e¤ect
dominates the crowd-in e¤ect21.
Here we will add a few remarks on the e¤ect of bubbles on the aggregate
productivity. In the bubble economy, L-entrepreneurs stop investing and
only H-entrepreneurs invest, i.e., bubbles improve e¢ ciency in production by
eliminating low productive investment. Thus, the total factor productivity
increases together with the emergence of bubbles. It moves procyclically
with economic growth if  is relatively low. This implies that bubble burst
produces productive ine¢ ciency.
4.1 A Change in Investment Opportunities and the
Existence Condition of Bubbles
In this subsection, we examine how changes of investment opportunities a¤ect
the existence condition of bubbles. It is sometimes claimed that the shortage
of investment opportunities causes of bubbles. Here we check this intuition.
In this model, the probability that an agent faces H-projects, p; represents
the degree of investment opportunities. Hence, let us imagine that p declines,
which implies that it becomes more di¢ cult to nd the investment with high
protability. From proposition 2, we can derive that
d=dp < 0; d=dp < 0:
Intuition is as follows. In nancially low-developed regions, because of the
decline in p, the growth rate of the economy decreases while the interest rate
is unchanged at L: As a result, the existence condition for bubbles becomes
tighter. On the other hand, in nancially high-developed regions, due to the
decline in p; the interest rate falls while the growth rate remain unchanged at
H : As a result, the condition gets loosened. We can do the same thought
experiment on changes in H=L: We summarize the above results in the
following proposition.
Proposition 5 Both  and  are decreasing functions of p. This means that
21In our model, the presence of L-projects plays a crucial role to show that bubbles
crowd investment in and enhance growth. Without it, in the bubbleless economy, the
interest rate adjusts such that all the savings in the economy ow to H-projects. In such
a situation, once bubble assets appear into the economy, they crowd savings away from
H-projects, thereby lowering the growth.
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a decrease of p tends to depress bubbles when  is low and tends to generate
bubbles when  is high.
5 E¤ects of the burst of bubbles
In this section, we examine the e¤ects of burst of bubbles. In this perfect
foresight model, an unexpected shock may generate the burst of bubbles. Let
us suppose that there is an unexpected shock at t = s which decreases the
productivity from H to S < H . First, we examine the case where this
shock is permanent (or at least this shock is expected to be permanent at
t = s.). As we have shown in the previous section, H  L is a necessary
condition for the existence of bubbles. Hence, if S is strictly smaller than
L=, bubbles must burst for any . Even if S  L=, bubbles may burst
if  is relatively low. Since  is a decreasing function of H , bubbles must
collapse in the countries whose pledgeability is lower than (S). This result
shows that even if the shock is common, the e¤ect of the shock is di¤erent
from country to country and in particular, the e¤ect on the stock price in a
country is crucially a¤ected by the nancial market condition of this country.
Next we examine how the growth rate in each country is a¤ected by the
unexpected shock at t = s. After the collapse of bubbles, the growth rate
is determined by the mechanism explained in Section 2, Hence, the growth
rate after the shock becomes,
gt = g() =
8>>><>>>:
S   (S   L)
L(1  p)  S
L   S if 0   < (1  p)
L
S
;
S; if (1  p)
L
S
   1:
Since the productivity is lower than before, the growth rate becomes lower
than that of the bubble periods. Although the growth rate under the bubble
economy is not lower than L, the growth rates must be lower than L after
the burst when S < L. Furthermore, the variance of growth rates among
countries becomes higher after the burst. The reason is as follows. The
countries whose  is      experienced relatively high growth rate by
the existence of bubbles. This means that after the burst of bubbles, those
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countries experience the decrease in the growth rate from the two reasons,
the decrease in productivity and the burst of bubbles. Hence, those countries
experience relatively very low growth rate after the burst of bubbles. On the
other hand, the countries whose  is  <  <  su¤er the decrease in the
growth rate by the decrease in productivity but this e¤ect must be o¤set by
the positive e¤ect of the burst on the growth rate, since the growth rates
of those countries were decreased by the existence of bubbles. In summary,
the low (high)  countries experience relatively lower (higher) growth rates,
thus the variance of the growth rate becomes higher even though the average
growth rate must be lower than before the burst. This result may be consis-
tent with an empirical observation. Figure 3 shows the growth rates of Asian
countries before and after the nancial crisis. The gure shows that the vari-
ance of the growth rates becomes higher after the crisis. Of course, actual
growth rates must be a¤ected by many factors, our result is not inconsistent
with this interesting observation.
Next we examine the case where the unexpected shock is temporary and
it is expected so after the shock. In this case, bubbles might exist even after
the shock since all agents can expect that this shock is temporary. In order
to sustain the bubble path after the shock, however, the price of bubbles, Ps;
must drop according to the shock. The reason is as follows. Let us suppose
the shock is temporary and the productivity recovers to H after t = s + 1.
Under the shock, from t = s+1, the growth rate of each country can recover
to gt () but Yt must be lower since Ys+1 is decreased by the shock. Hence, in
order to sustain the bubble path, the price of bubbles must be adjusted with
the decrease of Yt and must decrease at t = s. This result suggests that the
decrease of asset prices does not directly mean the burst of bubbles. It might
be an adjustment process of bubbles. Even after the drop of asset prices,
bubbles can exist even under the perfect foresight economy as long as there
is an unexpected shock.
It is not necessary, however, that people continue to choose the bubble
path even after the unexpected shock. People may choose the bubbleless path
after the shock. Hence, bubbles may burst if agents revise their expectation
by the shock and expect that the value of the bubble is zero even if the
productivity shock is temporary and H recovers to the original level at
t = s+1, Next, we examine how the bubble bursts a¤ect the economic growth
rates in this case. Since the bubbles have bursted at t = s, the growth rate
follows (20) from t = s+1. This implies that the di¤erence in the growth rate
between before and after the burst of bubbles can be characterized by the
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di¤erence in the growth rate between the bubble economy and the bubbleless
economy. Hence, we get that If     , the growth rate becomes lower
after the burst of bubbles but if  <  < , the growth rate becomes higher
(except t = s) after the burst of bubbles. This result suggests that the
e¤ect of bubble bursts is not uniform. It is crucially a¤ected by the nancial
condition of each country. If the imperfection of nancial market is relatively
high, the burst of bubbles decreases the growth rate of the country but the
burst may enhance the long run growth rate if the nancial market condition
is relatively good. This point is shown in Figure 422. In other words, the
burst of bubbles explores the "true" economic condition of each country. This
result also means that the variance of growth rates among countries becomes
higher and once again this result is consistent with the observation in Figure
3.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we assumed the imperfection of the nancial market and exam-
ined the e¤ects of bubbles under the imperfect nancial market. We explored
that the existence condition of bubbles is related to the nancial market con-
dition and the middle range of pledgeability allows the existence of bubbles.
This suggests that improving the nancial market condition might enhance
the possibility of bubbles if the initial condition of the nancial market is
underdeveloped. Moreover, the e¤ects of bubbles on the economic growth
rates are also related to the nancial market condition. If the pledgeabil-
ity is relatively low, bubbles increase the growth rate but bubbles decrease
the growth rate if the pledgeability is relatively high. This result has an
important implication for the e¤ects of bubble bursts. The burst of bub-
bles decreases the growth rate when the nancial market condition is not so
good, but the burst may enhance the growth rate when the nancial market
condition is relatively good.
Our model can be extended to several directions. One would be to con-
sider stochastic bubbles. In the case of stochastic bubbles, the entrepreneurs
portfolio decision is more complicated than in the deterministic bubbles. Risk
22If     ; the growth rate at t = s might be higher than t = s 1 if the temporary
shock is not so large since the growth rate is enhanced by the burst of bubbles even at
t = s.
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averse L-entrepreneurs want to hedge themselves by investing in their own L-
projects as well as buy bubbles and lend to H-entrepreneurs. If  is relatively
low, the interest rate may stick to L and may not rise together with the
emergence of bubbles, and hence only growth-enhancing e¤ects of bubbles
are generated. Another direction would be to endogenous : In this model,
we assume that  is exogenously given and constant over time. However,
in the real world, it may be natural to think that  keeps increasing over
time. It would be worthwhile to endogenous  by, for example, developing
a theory of secondary markets such as Broner et al. (2010), and how this
might change bubble regions. Finally, we have not analyzed welfare impli-
cations of bubbles, policy-oriented issues such as governments intervention
after bubble bursts or how regulations in the nancial markets will a¤ect the
emergence of bubbles. These would be also promising works.
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